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Abstract 
We introduce simulation models of stock exchange to explore which traders are successful and how their strategies 
influence to their wealth and probability of bankruptcy. The results of our experiments show that there is a critical 
level of agent’s experience (or luck) such that agents with this or higher level almost sure will survive on the 
market on the long run. This critical level is just slightly higher 1/2 and such small value explains why so many 
people try to trade on the stock exchange. But if trader uses margin trading, the critical level is much higher and 
shows the risk of excessive losses. 
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1. Introduction 
Last decades the agent-based simulation models were widely used in many research areas, including 
economics and finance. Such models were used to analyze the stock exchange behavior, e.g. to investigate the 
nature of asset price dynamics and speculative bubbles (see for example2, 4, 8, 13, 16, 19), to compare the efficiency 
of fundamental and technical analysis2, 8, 9, 17 or to assess the impact the herding effect4, 7, 10, 15, 18. We would like 
to investigate the stock exchange processes from the viewpoint of an individual trader and find out which 
traders can ‘survive’ on the stock exchange and which traders will be driven out of the market. 
We do not consider the most commonly used distinction of the trader as fundamentalist or chartist, where 
the former make investment decisions based on the financial reports and the latter forecast future prices using 
the observations of the past price movements. Instead of it we combine these types of strategy in one type and 
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consider agent with one personal characteristic denoting the accuracy of her prediction of future asset price 
movements, as the financial result and the likelihood of trader’s bankruptcy depend on this characteristic in 
both frameworks. It was shown1 that if this probability of correct identification of market situation is slightly 
higher than 50%, it allows the trader to receive a positive average gain from trading. 
Another considered here strategy is ‘the follower’ strategy. Such strategy is the simplest case of imitation 
behavior, and it was shown7 that traders do have incentives to imitate and for some of them it turns out to be 
profitable. Indeed, making decisions based on available economic information analysis is costly and requires 
experience and one have to process a lot of information, so many traders take into account the available 
analytic reports or opinions of colleagues and friends. According to estimation12, the proportion of informed 
orders is less than 10%.  
Also trader can imitate either the market or any other traders. The first case refers to a situation when the 
trader follows the mood of the market, i.e. if everyone buys ('bull' market), then a trader would like to buy, and 
if everybody sells and the price falls ('bear' market), then the trader will also sell. In the second case we can 
assume that there are traders in the market (so called ‘guru’), which other traders think to be more experienced, 
or lucky, or have access to restricted information (insiders). Investment decisions of these players are of great 
interest to other agents and for someone can be may be the only benchmark for decision making.   
‘The follower’ strategy can be used by the newcomers or traders, who for some reason do not have the 
ability or desire to process information to make an independent decision, and even professional players are 
tempted to follow the euphoria of bullish or bearish trend, although the propensity to herd is lower for 
professional investors than for the amateur6. 
The follower strategy seem rational and appealing for the traders as an attempt to receive more information, 
but the reverse side of it is herding effect that can lead to the large losses, chaos and speculative bubbles on the 
market4, 5, 14. We will leave aside the question of how this herding effect causes bubbles and analyze if it is 
reasonable for small investors to use this strategy. 
2. Model description 
2.1. The description of market, agent and price data 
In our model there is a market of one asset and a population of N agents. In the basic model the agents differ 
in only one personal characteristic p, that models the probability of the agent to correctly predict the direction 
of price movement at the next day. It is assumed that this characteristic does not change during the life of the 
agent, and at the same time we do not care of the basis of the agent decisions (it can be fundamental or 
technical approach). At the beginning of all experiments all agents have initial cash and do not have the 
securities. 
We will explore a part of the market, which consists of small and medium-sized agents and assume that 
these agents do not have an impact on the asset price. We also assume that the market is sufficiently liquid and 
all the orders can be executed completely. All agents are speculators, so they are interested not in the asset as a 
long-term investment, but want to make a profit on price difference. Therefore, all orders are designed for 
short-term and agents trade on the daily price fluctuations. In addition, the agents in our model submit only 
market orders. Such order includes the volume and do not specify a price, so it is immediately executed at the 
current market price. The agents in our model do not submit more complex orders. 
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To assess the success of agents at the end of a day we evaluate their wealth as a sum of their cash and the 
number of their shares multiplied by the market price of the next day. The next day market price is used in this 
assessment because agents will be able to sell stocks only at the next day. If the welfare of the agent is less than 
a critical level (we use a one-half of the initial wealth), then the agent will leave the market and we denote her 
as a bankrupt. 
We will explore as well the impact of short selling and margin buying on welfare and the possibility of 
bankruptcy. Short selling denotes the selling of borrowed securities with subsequent repurchase of the same 
securities. The trader opens a short position expecting the fall of the asset price, which allows him to buy it 
later for less money and return to the lender. The difference in the purchase price and the sale price will make 
trader’s profits. Margin buying refers to the buying of securities with cash borrowed from a broker. Leverage 
rate denotes the ratio between the collateral and the loan. For example, leverage rate 1:5 means that the trader 
can take a margin loan 5 times greater than collateral. Margin buying and short selling can increase trader’s 
returns but it can also magnify losses. Margin trading will be prohibited in crisis days in our experiment. 
Prohibition can be caused by lenders as they see the increased risk of traders’ bankruptcy. 
As the agents have no impact on the price of the asset (they are price-takers), the price of the asset must be 
specified exogenously and we have used here daily data of the different indices for the period 01.01.2000-
31.12.2009. The time series consists of the closing prices. We used the S&P500 (data contains 2514 
observations), the CAC 40 (2552 observations), the DAX (2542 observations), the FTSE (2525 observations), 
the Nikkei 225 (2453 observations) and Hang Seng (2488 observations) indices.  
To separate days potentially suitable for restrictive measures on short selling and margin buying, we have 
used the volatility index, calculated with a sliding interval of 20 days, and apply a threshold rule: if the 
volatility value does not exceed the corresponding index value multiplied by a predetermined threshold value, 
then we will consider that day to be regular (the economy is stable), and in case of excess we assume that the 
market is in a crisis and impose a prohibition to the opening of short positions and use of margin buying. 
2.2. The basic model 
At the beginning of simulations all agents have c0=10000 of capital and s0=0 of securities, and their initial 
wealth is w0=10000. 
Agents in our experiments are speculators and make decisions on short-run. Agents differ only by a single 
characteristic p, which models the ability of the agent to correctly identify the direction of the asset price. The 
value p is random, it is selected at the beginning of the experiment and stays unchanged during the life of the 
agent on the market. 
On each t-th iteration agent i make a decision to buy (di,t=+1) or sell (di,t=-1). If the agent expects the price 
reduction, it is now profitable to sell assets at the current price to prevent a wealth decline in the next moment. 
If at time t agent predicts the growth of the asset price, then the agent should buy shares at price  and 
his wealth will increase in the next moment of time.  
After making decisions all agents submit their orders to the stock exchange. Agents use market orders 
where they should denote the volume of asset they want to buy or sell. If margin buying is forbidden and agent 
decision is ‘buy’, then the volume is set to vi,t=z∙ci,t/pricet,  where z is a random value with uniform distribution 
R[0,1]. In other case the volume is set to vi,t=z∙leverage∙wi,t/pricet, where leverage  is the leverage rate. 
Analogously the volume for the ‘sell’ decision can be set. 
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After execution of all orders we recalculate the number of agent's securities  si,t+1 and the agent's money 
ci,t+1, and estimate agents wealth as wi,t= ci,t+1 + si,t+1 ∙ pricet+1. If agent i’s wealth at time t is less than a 
threshold wi,t≤1/2 w0=5000 and he becomes a bankrupt, then he will leave the market. 
2.3. The model with followers 
In this model we divide the whole population of agents into two equal groups. Agents from the first group 
act according to the scheme from the previous section and have a single characteristic p. Agents from the 
second group do not make own decisions (do not have a characteristic p), but observe the actions of agents 
from the first group and simply repeat their actions with a delay of one moment. For each agent from the first 
group (we call them leaders) there is only one agent from the second group, copying his actions (we will call 
him a follower), so every follower has his own leader, and only one. 
3. The results 
3.1. The results of the basic model 
For all models we will consider three parameters: 1) the average wealth on final date of ‘survived’ agents, 
2) the fraction of agents from the whole population, whose wealth on the final date was higher than the initial 
wealth, 3) the fraction of bankrupts in the whole population (we denote bankrupt as an agent, whose wealth is 
lower than a half of the initial one).  
We conducted experiments with the parameter p equal to one number for all agents and repeat this 
experiment with one value of p 150 times. We have done such set of experiments for p changing from 0.3 to 
0.7 with an increment 0.01for each level of leverage. 
Fig. 1 shows the results for the case of prohibited margin trading and short selling for p from 0.47 to 0.57. 
You can see that for agents with p≥0.52 the probability of bankruptcy is less than 1%, and in all our 
experiments for prohibited margin trading the agents with p≥0.56 never experienced a bankruptcy (we remind 
that we denoted a bankruptcy as a decline of agent’s wealth below the threshold of 5000, that is a half of initial 
wealth). 
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Fig. 1. The average wealth (left), the share of agents, whose wealth on the final date is higher than the initial level (center) and the 
share of bankrupts in the whole population (right) dependence of the p =0.47,…,0.57 when margin trading is prohibited (leverage=0). Grey 
dots correspond to the results of experiments, black lines denote the average values of thee three parameters for the whole set of 
experiments. The data of S&P500 was used. 
 
One can see on Fig. 1 that when p increases the wealth of not-bankrupts grows, the fraction of bankrupts 
also grows and the fraction of agents with the final wealth greater than the initial one reduces. Of course, if we 
allow to hold short positions and to use margin trading, then the frequency of bankruptcies significantly 
increases compared with the basic model and welfare increases, especially for agents with high values of p 
(Table 1). 
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Table 1. Results of experiments with allowed margin trading and short selling with different level of leverage 
p leverage=0 leverage=2 leverage=5 leverage=10 
The fraction of agents with final wealth greater than initial one, % 
0.50 35.4 29.8 10.3 1.3 
0.51 52.8 47.7 20.2 3.6 
0.52 70.3 67.6 38.0 8.7 
0.53 85.7 85.4 56.2 18.2 
0.54 92.8 93.1 69.3 29.2 
0.55 97.1 97.4 78.5 40.0 
0.56 99.3 98.7 86.3 50.6 
0.57 99.7 99.3 89.1 59.2 
0.58 99.9 99.5 92.7 67.6 
0.59 99.9 99.8 94.9 73.5 
0.60 100.0 99.9 97.3 78.2 
0.61 100.0 99.9 98.2 82.1 
0.62 100.0 100.0 98.5 84.5 
0.63 100.0 100.0 98.6 86.7 
0.64 100.0 100.0 99.5 90.4 
0.65 100.0 100.0 99.5 92.9 
 The fraction of bankrupts,% 
0.50 6.2 52.2 88.5 98.6 
0.51 2.7 37.5 77.6 96.2 
0.52 0.9 20.7 60.6 90.8 
0.53 0.2 10.2 42.4 81.4 
0.54 0.0 5.0 30.3 70.5 
0.55 0.0 2.4 21.4 59.8 
0.56 0.0 1.0 13.7 49.3 
0.57 0.0 0.7 10.9 40.8 
0.58 0.0 0.5 7.3 32.4 
0.59 0.0 0.0 5.1 26.5 
0.60 0.0 0.0 2.7 21.8 
0.61 0.0 0.0 1.8 17.9 
0.62 0.0 0.0 1.5 15.5 
0.63 0.0 0.0 1.4 13.3 
0.64 0.0 0.0 0.5 9.6 
0.65 0.0 0.0 0.5 7.0 
 
Now we describe summary results for all 6 stock indices. The main conclusion is based on the Table 2. One 
can see that even for the case of forbidden margin trading the agent should have a value of p higher than 0.5 to 
assure with high probability getting final wealth greater than initial and very little probability of bankruptcy. 
And usage of margin trading requires higher values of p for agent to achieve the positive increment in her final 
wealth and negligible probability of bankruptcy. For the case of margin trading with leverage rate 1:10 the 
agent should have an extremely high p that can be possible for insiders, for instance. 
Table 2. Parameters for 6 stock indices 
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 S&P 500 CAC 40 DAX FTSE Nikkei 225 
Hang 
Seng 
 leverage=0 
p, such that ‘survived’ agent with higher p gets average final wealth 
higher than initial one  0.51 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.48 
p, such that Pr{final wealth greater than initial}≥ 99% 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.54 
p, such that Pr{final wealth greater than initial}≥ 99,9% 0.60 0.57 0.60 0.58 0.59 0.58 
p , such that Pr{become bankrupt}≤ 1% 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.52 0.54 0.52 
p , such that Pr{become bankrupt}≤0,1% 0.54 0.57 0.60 0.56 0.58 0.58 
 leverage=5 
p, such that Pr{final wealth greater than initial}≥ 99% 0.64 0.62 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.71 
p, such that Pr{final wealth greater than initial}≥ 99,9% 0.75 0.72 >0.75 0.71 0.72 >0.75 
p , such that Pr{become bankrupt}≤ 1% 0.64 0.62 0.64 0.61 0.63 0.71 
p , such that Pr{become bankrupt}≤0,1% 0.75 0.72 >0.75 0.71 0.71 >0.75 
 leverage=10 
p, such that Pr{final wealth greater than initial}≥ 99% 0.74 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.73 >0.85 
p, such that Pr{final wealth greater than initial}≥ 99,9% >0.85 >0.85 >0.85 >0.85 >0.85 >0.85 
p , such that Pr{become bankrupt}≤ 1% 0.74 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.73 >0.85 
p , such that Pr{become bankrupt}≤0,1% >0.85 >0.85 >0.85 >0.85 >0.85 >0.85 
 
In Table 3 we present results of agent, if she permanently tosses a coin instead of decision making, i.e. her p 
is equal to 0.5. It is interesting to see, that without margin trading such agents on average cannot receive a gain 
on the stock exchange, but using leverage causes dramatic increase of bankruptcy probability. Not many people 
would like to pay 10 000 for a lottery with probability to win 130 000 with 1% chance and get 0 with 99%. 
Table 3. Parameters for an  agent with p=0.5. 
 S&P 500 CAC 40 DAX FTSE Nikkei 225 Hang Seng 
 leverage=0 
Average wealth of not-bankrupts 9 584 9 464 11 098 9 667 8 929 12 719 
The fraction of agents with final wealth 
greater than initial wealth,% 35.35 28.05 45.35 37.36 18.83 71.12 
The fraction of bankrupts,% 6.17 19.58 23.17 3.95 24.09 5.16 
 leverage=5 
Average wealth of not-bankrupts 43 427 64 072 66 643 44 156 56 847 61 566 
The fraction of agents with final wealth 
greater than initial wealth,% 10.31 5.47 7.67 10.35 5.51 9.06 
The fraction of bankrupts,% 88.54 93.95 91.16 88.12 93.66 89.86 
 leverage=10 
Average wealth of not-bankrupts 2e+05 3e+05 2e+05 3e+05 5e+05 3e+05 
The fraction of agents with final wealth 
greater than initial wealth,% 1.32 0.21 0.67 1.26 0.47 0.89 
The fraction of bankrupts,% 98.62 99.79 99.27 98.63 99.51 99.09 
3.2. The results of model with followers 
As you can see on Fig.2 and in Table 4, this strategy in case of cautious behavior (when leverage=0) leads 
to good results, because in general the probability of bankruptcy is small and the average final wealth is higher 
than initial with non-zero probability. And again, if agent uses margin trading, the average wealth and 
probability of bankruptcy grow. So, the ‘follower’ strategy can be considered mostly as more profitable in 
comparison with the strategy of ‘tossing a coin’ (Table 3), especially when agent do not use short selling and 
margin trading. 
The dispersion of average final wealth of non-bankrupts in case of leverage=10 is caused by the fact, that 
sample of non-bankrupts in this case is very small as majority of agents were declared as bankrupts. 
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Table 4. Results for ‘follower’ strategy for S&P500 data 
Value of 
leader’s p 
Average 
wealth of 
follower 
Better 
wealth of 
follower 
Bankrupts 
among 
followers 
Average 
wealth of 
follower 
Better 
wealth of 
follower 
Bankrupts 
among 
followers 
Average 
wealth of 
follower 
Better 
wealth of 
follower 
Bankrupts 
among 
followers 
 leverage=0 leverage=5 leverage=10 
0.40 11 044 31.0 0.7 91 778 21.8 75.5 51 940 1.8 98.2 
0.41 11 018 28.8 0.9 48 753 14.5 80.9 260 832 2.5 97.5 
0.42 10 654 28.5 1.0 66 802 16.4 81.8 30 727 1 99 
0.43 10 728 26.2 0.9 47 134 15.5 83.6 323 271 0.5 99.5 
0.44 10 336 25.3 1.4 49 738 12.7 84.5 59 670 1.2 98.8 
0.45 10 131 23.1 1.5 52 434 18.9 79.1 163 849 1.6 98.64 
0.46 9 926 22.2 1.9 50 334 17.3 80.9 230 542 1.4 98 .6 
0.47 9 970 21.2 2.1 85 579 8.3 89.1 18 023 1.3 98.7 
0.48 9 946 19.8 2.3 37 389 14.8 83.6 59 015 0.7 99.3 
0.49 9 603 19.3 2.5 65 388 19.1 79.1 29 822 1.9 98.1 
0.50 9 590 17.5 3.2 39 833 10.6 87.3 28 308 2.8 97.2 
0.51 9 559 17.0 3.1 52 156 16.1 82.7 18 291 1.5 98.5 
0.52 9 408 15.8 3.6 39 057 8.5 87.3 - 0 100 
0.53 9 443 13.9 4.4 87 119 4.5 95.5 14 227 0.1 99.9 
0.54 9 050 12.9 4.7 36 900 10.9 88.2 - 0 100 
0.55 8 839 11.7 5.1 28 826 7.3 90.9 639 577 0.9 99.1 
0.56 9 012 11.7 6.0 18 045 2.4 96.4 - 0 100 
0.57 9 069 10.0 6.8 16 397 6.4 90.9 55 243 1.4 98.6 
0.58 8 592 9.2 7.5 95 561 5.9 93.6 18 908 2.1 97.9 
0.59 8 414 8.1 8.1 28 376 1.8 97.3 - 0 100 
0.60 8 590 7.4 9.0 16 725 2.7 95.5 75 147 2.2 97.8 
 
The results for the case of forbidden margin trading are shown on Fig. 2. The evident slope of all 
parameters, giving a small advantage for lower values of leader’s p, can be explained as a particular property of 
chosen simplest strategy of imitation. Since our follower simply repeat decision of her leader with one step 
delay, the key factor of her successfulness is the frequency of trend changes. If the right decision for Day 1 was 
‘to buy’ and for Day 2 to is ‘to sell’ and the leader was qualified enough to make these proper decisions (i.e. 
leader has high p), then the follower will make mistake on Day 2 choosing ‘to buy’ after her leader, because 
price trend changes on Day 2 from bullish to bearish. And follower’s decision to sell on Day 3 will be correct 
as price trend continues to decline. Conversely, if the leader more often make wrong decisions (her p is low), 
then she will be likely to choose ‘to sell’ on Day 1 and ‘to buy’ on Day 2, hence, the follower will gain on Day 
2 and lose money on Day 3. And the same reasons can be given for the days when trend was switched from 
bearish to bullish. 
The S&P500 data has 2514 observations (days) and 54,5% days of it are trend-switching days, so indeed it 
is slightly more profitable to follow weak leaders. The CAC 40 index has 52,7% of trend-switching days, the 
DAX – 51,5%, the FTSE – 52,5%, the Nikkei 225 – 51,5% and the Hang Seng index has 51,35% of trend-
switching days. 
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Fig. 2. These graphs show the dependence of average wealth (left), the share of agents, whose wealth on the final date is higher than the 
initial level (center) and the share of bankrupts in the whole population (right) on the p =0.4-0.6 when margin trading is prohibited 
(leverage=0). Grey dots correspond to the results of experiments, black lines denote the average values of thee three parameters for the 
whole set of experiments. 
For all 6 stock indices the results are very similar. For the case of forbidden margin trading the probability 
of the bankruptcy is low and the final wealth of the followers is close to the initial value of 10 000, even for the 
case of Nikkei (always slightly lower) and DAX and Hang Seng (always slightly higher) indices. And for the 
case of margin trading with leverage rate of 1:10 the probability of bankruptcy became extremely high, 
although agent can 10-100 times increase her wealth if she succeeds.  
Thus the ‘follower’ strategy has similar results with the strategy of ‘tossing the coin’ for the case of margin 
trading; for the case of leverage = 0 the ‘follower’ strategy is comparable in average gain, but has advantages in 
the probability of bankruptcy – mostly it is always lower than for the ‘tossing a coin’ strategy.  
4. Conclusion 
We analyzed different trading strategies of small and medium-sized investors on the stock exchange and 
consequences of using short selling and margin buying.  
The results of our experiments show that there is a critical level of agent’s experience (or luck) such that 
agents with this or higher level almost sure will survive on the market on the long run. This critical level is just 
slightly higher ½ for the case of cautious behavior (i.e. absence of margin trading), as it was shown1, and such 
small value explains why so many people try to trade on the stock exchange. But if trader uses margin trading, 
the critical level is much higher and shows the risk of excessive losses.  
The case of agent absolutely random chooses to buy or to sell assets (then her probability to make right 
decision is 0.5) is disadvantageous without margin trading and dangerous with it, because the probability to 
become a bankrupt is very high. At the same time it is known that analysts often fail to achieve even 50% rate 
of correct forecasts3, 20. 
From this point of view for small trader without high trading experience or access to insider information to 
make informed decisions (with high values of p) it will be more reasonable to simply follow another trader’s 
142   L. Egorova /  Procedia Computer Science  31 ( 2014 )  133 – 142 
decision, especially when agent does not use the margin trading. In contradiction to coming to mind suggestion 
that following the agent with high prediction rate should be more profitable, we found out the reverse situation, 
although the difference between ‘following the good predictor’ and ‘following the bad predictor’ strategies is 
not very significant. 
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